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Noise Traders, Fintech and Equity Market Volatility 
 
Abstract 
The literature provides ample evidence that the last decades have seen an increase in 
noise trader activities, in part driven by the development of fintech. This paper strives to 
educate readers on the term noise traders as well as fintech. Moreover, it argues that the 
evolvement of noise trader activities accompanied with fintech has increased equity 
market volatility over time. The study finds that equity market volatility has indeed 
increased over time and is not driven by periods of crisis. Furthermore, this increase in 
volatility is more severe for small stocks versus large stocks, which is in line with the 
stated hypothesis that low volume stocks (small stocks) are more impacted by noise 
trades. Additionally, the study finds higher volatility for daily returns versus volatility based 
on weekly or monthly returns, which supports the notion that noise traders move more 
quickly in and out of equity markets. Finally, sectors which are potentially more impacted 
by noise trader activities, due to their growth and media coverage, also demonstrate 











Throughout the Covid-19 pandemic, equity markets in the United States have 
seen unprecedented levels of volatility. From its high in February, the S&P 500 dropped 
over 30% in a single month only to rebound later in the year to all-time highs. With such 
extreme movements within the market, it is important for an investor to understand what 
factors are at play creating the volatility. While the pandemic has been the largest 
catalyst of market movements, upon analyzing market trends, there are two potential 
underlying factors that may have exacerbated volatility. These two potential driving 
factors of volatility are noise traders and fintech. Noise traders are irrational individuals 
who trade on incomplete or false information. This leads to equity prices diverging from 
a fundamental value because of noise traders investing based on false information (De 
Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann, 1990). The impacts of noise traders on equity 
markets may have been enhanced by recent developments related to fintech, 
specifically zero commission trading and fractional shares, which allows any market 
participant to buy and sell shares without having to pay transaction costs for their 
trades.  
The purpose of this paper is twofold: First, we aim to explain and educate the 
reader about noise traders as well as fintech. By understanding the potential impact of 
noise traders and fintech on equity markets, investors may be better prepared to 
navigate current market conditions by evaluating risk levels. Second, we investigate the 
potential impact of noise traders on the volatility of equity markets. If noise traders are 
indeed irrational, they are assumed to cause more volatility. Moreover, noise traders are 





Thus, one would expect that they have a higher impact on the short-term volatility of 
daily returns compared to the volatility of weekly or monthly returns. Furthermore, noise 
traders may have a larger impact on stocks with smaller trading volume (usually small 
stocks) versus stocks with higher volume (typically larger stocks). Additionally, the 
advancements in fintech may have increased noise trading activities; thus, one would 
expect an increase in volatility over time, and a greater impact over time on small stocks 
versus large stocks. Finally, different sectors might be more impacted by noise trading 
compared to other sectors. Noise traders might be more active in the IT sector, where 
they may be less active in a sector such as utilities. 
What is Noise Trading? 
The term noise was first introduced by Black (1986) in his paper ‘Noise’ to 
describe small events that cause a disproportionate impact relative to their size. A noise 
trader, as defined by De Long et al. (1990), is an irrational individual who trades on 
incomplete or false information. This is opposite to the rational investor, who is an 
individual that reasonably calculates the costs and benefits of every action before 
making an investment decision. The rational investor is used as the basis for many 
economic theories and financial models. Noise traders were further defined by Shliefer 
and Summers (1990) as individuals who chase trends and rumors rather than investing 
based off a company’s fundamentals or solid technical analysis. This formal definition of 
noise then evolved to describe individuals who speculate based on these events. While 
noise traders have only had a formal definition for a relatively short period of time, these 
types of traders have always existed, but in the age of media and internet as well as 





partially due to the amount of information that investors are provided. For example, a 
quick web search of the phrase “Disney Stock” yields hundreds of millions of results. 
This volume of information creates concerns of an information overload, as even a 
rational investor may be misled by inaccurate or erroneous information. 
With more noise comes increased risk associated with these speculators. In his 
study on noise trader risk within financial markets, De Long et al. (1990) states that: 
“The unpredictability of noise traders' beliefs creates a risk in the price of the asset that 
deters rational arbitrageurs from aggressively betting against them. As a result, prices 
can diverge significantly from fundamental values even in the absence of fundamental 
risk. Moreover, bearing a disproportionate amount of risk that they themselves create 
enables noise traders to earn a higher expected return than rational investors do.” This 
shows that noise investors are the opposite of rational investors, as they seek to gain 
excess returns during a short-time horizon.  
Noise trading alone presents an increase in risk, but as of late patterns of herd 
behavior have been present amongst noise traders. Herd behavior is when individuals 
within a group begin to act collectively as a whole without centralized direction. This has 
created tailwinds for noise investors who have created enough demand to drive stock 
prices higher, diverging from a fundamental value. As De Long et al, (1990) state, 
“prices can diverge significantly from fundamental values.” Internet chat forums have 
even been created for noise investors claiming noise as due diligence on companies. 
Figure 1 shows an example in Hertz (HTZ) of a company’s stock price that has 







Figure 1: Hertz Closing Price 
 
Hertz filed for bankruptcy on May 22, and within a month the stock jumped over 400% 
from its low on May 26. This was potentially a result of noise investors making bets that 
the distressed company would be given bankruptcy assistance from the US 
Government. Fundamentally, the company did not warrant the jump in share price as 
they produced negative earnings and generated a negative free cash flow over the 
previous four years which led to Hertz’s bankruptcy filing. Despite the poor historical 
performance, enough noise investors bought into the company that it created enough 
demand to drive the share price higher. Once the complete information came that Hertz 
would not receive the level of federal assistance to warrant that large of a recovery, the 
noise traders fled with their profits. Figure 1 also shows the short time horizon of noise 
traders. As mentioned above, noise traders seek above average returns in a short 




























































































































































































































Another example of noise trading is the hype generated around stock splits. A 
stock split is when a company reduces its share price while simultaneously increasing 
the number of shares outstanding to have a lower price per share. This is done to allow 
investors with less funds to buy into a company. Desai, Nimalendran, and 
Venkataraman (1998) write in their research that a stock split is an event that both 
creates noise and invites noise traders in with a lower price per share, and they 
conclude in their research that there is a significant increase in volatility following a split. 
While there are changes associated with a stock split, there are no changes to the 
company’s market capitalization. Often the result of a stock split leads to increased 
demand for the stock driving the price higher, but there are no fundamental changes to 
warrant this increase in price. This artificially created demand enables noise traders to 
push prices higher by increasing the demand for a stock. Recent stock splits by both 
Apple and Tesla saw increased demand at the time of the split, only to have the price 
fall back once the demand subsided. The prices rose over 10% following the late 





Figure 2: Apple and Tesla Post Stock Split 
These are just a few examples of how noise investors can create price 
movement within stocks. Often the swings will not be this extreme, but noise investors 
continue to create non-fundamental demand for companies which adds additional risk 
for the rational investor to consider when investing. 
What Is Fintech? 
Fintech, formally known as financial technology, is the innovation and 
incorporation of technology within the financial sector. It is the marriage of both finance 
and information technology to solve problems within the financial sector such as high 
costs, limitative regulation, and access for individuals. This technology is often 
disruptive in nature, as the financial sector has been dominated by a consistent number 
of players. Since the emergence of the internet in the early 2000’s, new technological 
innovations have continued to transform the financial sector. In his research on fintech, 

















































































































































































































and blur industry boundaries, facilitate strategic disintermediation, revolutionize how 
existing firms create and deliver products and services, provide new gateways for 
entrepreneurship, democratize access to financial services.”  For the purpose of this 
paper, the focus will remain on the impact of fintech on investing, but it is important to 
note that fintech has impacted all aspects of the financial sector from capital markets 
and insurance to retail banking.  
Two of the most impactful fintech innovations on investing have been the rise of 
zero commission brokerages as well as the ability to invest in fractional shares of 
companies. The main goal of these innovations is to democratize the financial markets 
by providing easy access for all individuals to participate in investments. Zero 
commission brokers, such as Robinhood, have disrupted the fee structure of all 
discount brokers, forcing competitors such as TD Ameritrade and Charles Schwab to 
cut trade commissions to zero to remain competitive. This allows investors to participate 
in trading and investing without the hurdle of paying a fee per trade. The innovation of 
fractional shares also lowers barriers to entry by allowing individuals to invest in 
companies at a cost level they deem reasonable. Fractional shares enable an investor 
to do this by allowing them to purchase a fraction of a share. For example, stocks such 
as Amazon and Alphabet trade at over $1,000 per share making it difficult for many 
retail investors to buy shares of these companies. With fractional shares this is no 
longer the case because an individual can invest any amount they would like into the 
company. 
While these innovations accomplish their goal of providing access to the markets 





unexperienced and uneducated investors. In an interview with Bloomberg, head of 
execution at Citadel Joe Mecane stated that “historically, retail investors have 
accounted for 10-15% of market activity, but they now make up roughly 20-25% of daily 
market volume.” This increase in market participation by retail investors directly relates 
to some of the market volatility in current market conditions, which can be traced back 
to the accessibility of investing and trading due to fintech innovations. 
Hypothesis 
Multiple hypotheses are formulated to examine how noise trading and fintech might 
have impacted volatility of equity markets.  
The rise of fintech, which has allowed for zero transaction costs, has made it 
easier and rather costless for noise traders to execute orders. Thus, if noise traders are 
indeed more irrational, one may expect there has been an increase in market volatility 
since the emergence of fintech in the early 2000’s. 
Hypothesis I: 
Equity market volatility has increased over the last decades and especially after 2000. 
Further, we argue that the trading activities of noise traders impact stocks with 
lower trading volume relatively more compared to stocks with a high trading volume. 
Since small stocks usually experience less trading volume than stocks of large well-
known companies, one may expect the volatility of small stocks to be higher.  
Hypothesis II: 





 Noise traders are known for having a rather short-term investment horizon and 
move in and out of the market quickly. Thus, we may expect that noise traders impact 
short-term volatility more than long-term volatility. 
Hypothesis III: 
Volatility increased more based on daily returns compared to weekly or monthly returns. 
Finally, certain sectors may be more impacted by noise traders than others. 
Thus, by comparing the returns and volatility of sectors that are more likely to be 
impacted by noise to those which are less likely, one can find potential signs of noise 
trading. If noise traders do indeed trade more on noise than on fundamentals, one may 
expect that sectors with high growth and news coverage, such as the technology sector, 
are more impacted by noise trader activities. 
Hypothesis IV: 
Certain sectors are more prone to noise trading; hence, they demonstrate higher levels 
of volatility. 
Data and Methodology 
To analyze market volatility, historical data is collected for the S&P 500, Russell 
2000, and Wilshire 5000. The S&P 500 has been selected to represent large stocks 
within the US market, and the Russell 2000 has been selected to represent small stocks 
within the US. These two indices are selected to examine differences in volatility of 
large and small stocks as potential evidence of noise trading. The Wilshire 5000 is 
selected as it represents all stocks within the US.  For these indices, closing prices are 





this data, volatility is calculated by using the standard deviation of the returns. This was 
in turn calculated with a 20-, 20-, and 40- year time horizon to compare historical trends 
in volatility. The first 20-year period is from January 1980 to December of 1999. The 
following 20-year period is from January 2000 to September 2020, and the 40-year 
period includes the entire period from 1980 to present. Furthermore, volatility is 
calculated considering only recessionary periods. In addition to calculating volatility, a 
modified Sharpe ratio assuming a risk-free rate of zero is calculated for all periods to 
show the risk-adjusted return for each index during the periods to examine how noise 
traders might have been compensated for excess risk. With recessionary times 
providing additional volatility, all volatilities are calculated for the same periods but with 
recession periods removed. The recession dates used are specified by the National 
Bureau of Economic Research as follows: Dotcom Financial Crisis March 2001 – 
November 2001, Global Financial Crisis December 2007 – June 2009, and the Covid-19 
Recession February 2020 to October 2020.  
After looking at market volatility, data is collected from SPDR sector funds from 
all GICS sectors excluding Real Estate and Communication Services as they are 
restructured in 2015 and 2018, respectively. Data is collected on a weekly basis going 
back to the inception of the SPDR sector funds in December of 1998. This data is then 
subjected to the volatility tests above, calculating standard deviations of returns and 









If there is increased volatility due to noise traders and fintech, then volatility 
should be increasing over time. Fintech first began to increase in popularity in the early 
2000’s. Table 1 shows the standard deviation of daily returns for the S&P 500 including 
times of crisis and recession, the Russell 2000 and the Wilshire 5000 for the period from 
January 1980 to December 1999, as well as the period from January 2000 to 
September 2020, and a final column with the standard deviation from the entire period. 
In line with hypothesis I, we find that there has been an increase in the volatility of daily 
returns for the later period from 2000 to 2020 compared to the entire period from 1980 
to 2020. Further, the results show in general that the small cap stock index (Russell 
2000) has higher volatility than the entire US market (Wilshire 5000) or the S&P 500, 
which is in line with our second hypothesis stating that the increase in volatility is larger 
for the small-cap index compared to the other two indices. This is also in line with our 
hypothesis that noise traders impact smaller stocks with lower trading volume more so 
than large stocks. Upon analyzing the Sharpe Ratios for the periods, there are lower 
Sharpe Ratios for the period 2000 – 2020 compared to 1980 – 2000. This shows that 
market participants have not been compensated for higher volatility over time. One may 
argue that the increase in volatility over time may have been driven by the crisis and 
recessions in the period from 2000 to 2020. Table 2 shows the results excluding the 
DotCom Financial Crisis (March 2001 – November 2001), the Global Financial Crisis 
(December 2007 – June 2009), and the Covid-19 Recession (February 2020 – October 
2020). Table 2 demonstrates that the results are robust with respect to the exclusion of 





Table 1: Volatility of Daily Returns and Sharpe Ratios Including Recession 
 
S&P 500 Russell 2000 
 
Wilshire 5000 
Standard Deviation 1980 - 2000 1.00% 0.95% 0.87% 
Standard Deviation 2000 - 2020 1.25% 1.55% 1.26% 
Standard Deviation since 1980 1.13% 1.34% 1.13% 
Sharpe Ratio 1980 – 2000 5.34% 4.04% 6.70% 
Sharpe Ratio 2000 – 2020 1.95% 2.14% 2.07% 
Sharpe Ratio since 1980 3.46% 2.63% 3.37% 
 
Table 2: Volatility of Daily Returns and Sharpe Ratios Excluding Recession 
 
S&P 500 Russell 2000 
 
Wilshire 5000 
Standard Deviation 1980 - 2000 1.00% 0.95% 0.87% 
Standard Deviation 2000 - 2020 0.98% 1.25% 0.99% 
Standard Deviation since 1980 0.99% 1.13% 0.94% 
Sharpe Ratio 1980 – 2000 5.34% 4.04% 6.70% 
Sharpe Ratio 2000 – 2020 3.85% 3.61% 3.94% 






Upon finding that there has been an increase in volatility over the past 40 years, 
the next step is to analyze how noise trading and fintech might have impacted volatility. 
If noise traders have short-time horizons, which has been stated in prior research by De 
Long et al., (1990) then there should be a larger increase in the volatility of daily returns 
versus volatility based on weekly or monthly returns. Tables 3 and 4 below compare the 
volatility measure based on daily, weekly, and monthly returns over the past 40- year 
and 20-year time periods. 
Table 3: Daily, Weekly and Monthly volatility from 1980 to 2020 
 
S&P 500 Russell 2000 
 
Wilshire 5000 
Daily 1.13% 1.34% 1.13% 
Weekly 2.30% 2.87% 2.34% 
Monthly 4.34% 5.61% 4.71% 
 
Table 4: Daily, Weekly and Monthly Volatility from 2000 to 2020 
 
S&P 500 Russell 2000 
 
Wilshire 5000 
Daily 1.25% 1.55% 1.26% 
Weekly 2.47% 3.17% 2.53% 







Table 5 presents the percent increase of the different volatilities as well as the 
different indexes. Upon comparing the two, there is a substantially higher percent 
increase in volatility based on daily returns relative to volatility based on both weekly 
and monthly returns. Thus, the result confirms Hypothesis III. Moreover, Table 5 
provides additional evidence for Hypotheses I and II, as it demonstrates that volatility 
has increased over time with a more severe increase in volatility for small stocks. 
Table 5: Percent Change of Volatility Between Periods per Index 
 
S&P 500 Russell 2000 
 
Wilshire 5000 
Daily 10.36% 15.20% 11.19% 
Weekly 7.49% 10.15% 8.17% 
Monthly 0.27% 1.75% -4.87% 
 
The higher increase in daily volatility across all indices points to noise traders as 
a potential factor for the increase in volatility, as they have shorter time horizons. Noise 
traders are enabled by zero commission trading, allowing them to enter and exit 
positions without cost. This allows them to focus on short-time horizons without risk of 
trading costs. It is of interest to note that the monthly returns see little to no change in 
volatility across the S&P 500 and the Russell 2000, leading one to believe that the 





Figure 3 below shows annualized volatility and, as seen in the trend lines 
markets are becoming more volatile with small cap stocks (Russell 2000) increasing at 
a much quicker pace than large cap stocks (S&P 500). 
Figure 3 Rolling Annual Daily Volatility 
The finding that small cap stocks are becoming increasingly more volatile than 
their large cap counterparts, as shown in Tables 1 and 3, might be explained by noise 
traders having a disproportionate effect on stock prices of smaller less-liquid companies 
which often have lower trading volume. With lower trading volume, a stock’s price may 
be impacted more so by noise traders than a large cap counterpart.  
In general, the presented findings above support the hypotheses that noise 
traders, enabled by fintech, have potentially impacted market swings. Given the above 
findings that noise trading and fintech have created more volatility over time and the 
current Covid-19 crisis has caused unprecedented market conditions, one may expect 
that the current crisis has caused more volatility compared to prior crises and 
recessions. Table 6 below compares the current recession to previous recessions. The 















when compared to the Dotcom Crisis and the Global Financial Crisis. Also, the Russell 
2000 shows more a higher volatility of daily returns than the S&P 500 and Wilshire 
5000. This supports both Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
Table 6: Comparison of Daily Volatility and Sharpe Ratios for Recessionary Periods 
 
S&P 500 Russell 2000 
 
Wilshire 5000 
Standard Deviation Dotcom Crisis 1.39% 1.46% 1.41% 
Standard Deviation Financial Crisis 2.41% 2.86% 2.40% 
Standard Deviation Covid-19  2.68% 3.29% 2.71% 
Sharpe Ratio Dotcom Crisis -2.53% -0.34% -2.36% 
Sharpe Ratio Financial Crisis -3.78% -2.20% -3.62% 
Sharpe Ratio Covid-19  1.10% -0.58% 1.25% 
 
After examining market volatility across time, different stock indexes, and 
volatility measures, it might be of value to analyze how volatility has changed for 
different sectors. As stated in the hypotheses section, noise trading might impact 
specific sectors differently. By calculating weekly returns for every GICS Sector 
represented by SPDR sector ETFs, one can compare volatility within each sector. 
Figure 4 shows the volatility of weekly returns since the inception of the SPDR ETFs in 
December of 1998. The volatility is presented for the entire period as well as the period 
before and after the global financial crisis. The data excludes the Real Estate and 





Figure 4: Sector Volatility Before and After the Global Financial Crisis 
 
Figure 4 shows that the Financial, Energy, and Information Technology sectors 
have been most volatile since the late 1990’s. The least volatile sectors have been 
Utilities, Healthcare, and Consumer Staples. This may confirm hypothesis IV, that noise 
traders are more active in sectors that experience growth and media coverage 
compared to more conservative sectors, such as utilities. However, Figure 4 also shows 
that volatility has been lower during the post global financial crisis period, compared to 
the pre global financial crisis period, for most sectors. This finding is rather unexpected, 
as one would have expected to see more volatility in the more recent period. However, 
we want to point out that the sector ETFs are only covering stocks within the S&P 500, 
which are large stocks and, hence, according to our previous findings less prone to 
noise trader activities.  Consequently, the higher volatility might have been more driven 
















leave a further investigation of the impact of noise traders on different sectors to future 
research. 
Conclusion 
The last two decades have seen an increase in noise trader activities amplified 
by the rise of fintech, which was accompanied by lower trading fees and ultimately zero 
commission as well as trading of fractional shares. In addition, fintech allows for the 
execution of simple trading algorithm. Since noise traders are described as irrational 
and trading based on incomplete information, this paper argues that fintech 
developments have increased noise trader activities and, hence, magnified volatility in 
certain equity markets. To this end, the paper finds that equity markets have indeed 
experienced an increase in volatility over the last decades. Moreover, this enhanced 
volatility is more pronounced for stocks with low market capitalization (small stocks) 
compared to stocks with large market capitalization (large stocks). It is argued that large 
stocks have a higher trading volume; hence, are less prone to noise trader activities. 
Additionally, the study finds that the volatility based on daily returns is higher compared 
to volatilities measures based on weekly or monthly returns. This might be explained by 
noise traders moving quickly in and out of the market; hence, leaving more of an impact 
on daily returns compared to monthly returns. Finally, the study demonstrates that 
certain sectors have experienced more volatility than others. This might be explained by 
noise traders focusing more on stocks with growth and high media coverage. The main 
result of increased equity market volatility in the most recent decades is not driven by 
periods of crisis and recession. In general, the results point in the direction of noise 





which holds especially true for small stocks and stocks with more media coverage, such 
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